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This paper investigates the determinants of group membership, and in partic-
ular the e¤ect of income inequality on individual incentives to join economic
groups. Drawing on a simple model, we show that an increase in inequality
has an ambiguous e¤ect and that the type of access rule (open versus re-
stricted access) is key in determining what income categories are represented
in the group. Furthermore, the shape of the income distribution can be cru-
cial to determine whether increased inequality leads to more or less group
participation. Using survey data from rural Tanzania we …nd that inequality
at the village level has a negative impact on the likelihood that the respon-
dents are members of any group. This e¤ect is particularly signi…cant for
relatively wealthier people, both when relative wealth is ‘objectively’ mea-
sured, and when it is ‘subjectively’ de…ned. However, when we disaggregate
groups by type of access rule, we …nd that inequality can have a positive
impact on participation, depending on the shape of the income distribution.
Finally, we assess the impact of inequality on various dimensions of group
functioning.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper investigates the determinants of participation in groups, and in
particular the e¤ect of heterogeneity on individual incentives to join groups
that provide some shared economic bene…ts. The particular form of hetero-
geneity considered is income inequality. We address such questions as: Is
group participation higher or lower in more unequal communities? When
inequality increases, is it the ‘poor’ or the ‘rich’ who drop out of the groups?
Does this depend on the type of access rule to the group? How are individual
incentives a¤ected by the shape of the distribution of income (i.e. by the fact
that heterogeneity may be concentrated in the lower or in the upper quintiles
of the distribution)?
These questions are relevant for a variety of reasons. First, there has
been growing attention on group formation and participation, as the latter is
recognized as an essential component of ‘social capital’. To the extent that
social capital has nonnegligible e¤ects on economic performance1, it becomes
important to understand the determinants of participation in groups, and
the role of members’ characteristics in shaping economic incentives within a
group. Surprisingly, no extensive work has been done on this topic. Empirical
investigations on the determinants of participation in socio-political groups
have been conducted on a sample of US cities by Di Pasquale and Glaeser
(1998), and by Alesina and La Ferrara (1999). Di Pasquale and Glaeser …nd
that social capital is positively associated with home ownership, while Alesina
and La Ferrara …nd that individuals are less likely to join groups in unequal
and racially fragmented communities because they prefer to interact with
people similar to themselves. This paper di¤ers from the above studies in
that it includes ‘economic’ groups and focuses on the asymmetry in bene…ts
and contributions between people with di¤erent levels of wealth.
A second reason underlying the relevance of this topic is that it nicely
complements the literature on inequality and collective action. Starting with
the seminal contributions by Olson (1965) and Bergstrom et al. (1986), who
predicted, respectively, a positive and a neutral e¤ect of income inequality on
public good provision, recent studies have emphasized the possibility that the
impact of increased inequality on collective action may indeed be negative.
Baland and Platteau (1997) have shown that increased inequality may lead
1On the impact of ‘social capital’ and participation on economic performance, see
among others Wade (1988), Ostrom (1990), Putnam et al. (1993), Isham, Narayan and
Pritchett (1995), Isham (1998), Narayan and Pritchett (1999).
1to less collective action when the free rider problem gets worse for the poor
and the set of contributors shrinks substantially. Baland and Ray (1997)
study the problem under di¤erent speci…cations for the production function
of the public good and …nd that if there is high complementarity among the
inputs of rich and poor members, higher disparities in income may lead to
less e¢ciency. Finally, Bardhan and Ghatak (1999) show that when there
are market imperfections in inputs that are complementary to the collective
goods, the relationship between inequality and e¢ciency will typically be
inverse U-shaped. Our paper does not study public goods, but something
that is closer to the notion of ‘club goods’.2 However, it shares with the
above literature the interest in the e¤ects and the workings of inequality.
Finally, there is very little empirical work on the determinants of group
formation. This paper exploits an unusually rich dataset from Tanzania con-
taining information on individual membership in a variety of groups that
di¤er for type of economic service provided, size, and access rule. Such in-
formation is often di¢cult to come across even for industrialized countries.
Furthermore, the relevance of issues like group composition and functioning
is particularly high for developing economies because in those contexts many
individuals rely on informal groups to get employment and production op-
portunities, as opposed to considering group participation as a side ‘social’
activity. We can thus be relatively con…dent that the type of economic in-
centives analyzed by the theory are at work in the settings we consider. This
is con…rmed by a recent study (Abraham et al., 1998) that has investigated
the patterns of participation in economic groups in the informal settlements
of Nairobi. However, the analysis by Abraham et al. (1998) is conducted
only at a descriptive level, and the role of inequality is not addressed.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows. In
the theoretical section we present a simple model in which heterogeneous
individuals can choose to join a group which provides an excludable good
to its members, and we derive predictions on the equilibrium composition
of the group and on its size under two alternative access rules. The …rst is
one of ‘open access’, by which anyone can join provided he or she pays the
cost. The second rule instead allows the members of the group to exclude
2In contrast with club models, where an exclusion mechanism is usually assumed, we
will study group composition both when there is excludability and when there is unre-
stricted access to the group. For a model of jurisdiction formation in which the choice of
the admission rule is endogenous, see Jehiel and Scotchmer (1997). For a general review
of club theory, see Cornes and Sandler (1996).
2someone by majority vote. We show that an increase in income inequality
has an ambiguous e¤ect both on group composition and on aggregate levels
of participation, and that the type of access rule is key in determining what
income categories are represented in the group. In particular, open access
groups will be formed by relatively poor individuals, while the composition
of restricted access groups will be unbalanced in favor of the relatively rich.
The impact of increased inequality on participation is ambiguous and de-
pends on the access rule and on the shape of the income distribution. In
particular, aggregate membership decreases under open access when hetero-
geneity increases in the lower part of the distribution, while participation can
actually increase under restricted access if the upper part of the distribution
is su¢ciently skewed.
We test the predictions of the theory using survey data on rural house-
holds from Tanzania. Our main empirical results are the following.
(i) Higher inequality in assets at the village level has a negative impact on
the likelihood that the respondents are members of some group. This result
holds when controlling for other kinds of heterogeneity and for the possible
endogeneity of inequality.
(ii) Inequality acts di¤erentially on rich and poor people: when inequality
increases, it is the relatively richer who drop out of groups, possibly because
they have less to gain. The motives behind the decision of the rich to with-
draw from groups are explored using both objective measures of relative
wealth and discrepancies in the subjective rankings given by the respondent
and by evaluation teams. We …nd that, for given ‘objective’ wealth, those
individuals who overestimate their relative rank in the village participate less
when inequality increases.
(iii) The impact of inequality on participation depends on the shape of
the distribution of wealth and on the access rule to the group. In particular,
it is negative for open access groups when there are wide disparities at the
bottom of the distribution, while it is positive for restricted access groups
when the disparities are around the middle and top part of the distribution.
(iv) Finally, group functioning in more unequal communities displays the
following features: decisions are less likely to be taken by vote; members tend
to sort into homogeneous income and ethnic groups; they more often report
poor group performance and misuse of funds; they interact less frequently,
and in general they feel less encouraged to participate. These e¤ects are
estimated separately for di¤erent categories of groups.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
model. Section 3 brie‡y describes the data set and comments on the trends
in participation and group composition. Section 4 illustrates our empirical
strategy. Section 5 contains the main results on the e¤ect of inequality —
and of heterogeneity in general— on individuals’ decisions to join groups.
In section 6, an attempt is made to estimate the impact of inequality on
aggregate outcomes at the group level, e.g. on group functioning, decision-
making processes, quality of information sharing, frequency of interaction,
etc. The results are presented separately for di¤erent categories of groups,
such as economic, religious, and political. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In this section we present a simple model of participation in groups in which
the net bene…ts from participation vary with individual wealth. The aim of
the model is to highlight one of the possible channels through which income
distribution and participation can be related. It should by no means be
regarded as an exhaustive theory, but rather as a framework to interpret our
empirical results.
The model studies the impact of increased inequality on individual and
aggregate levels of participation, comparing three possible mechanisms of
group functioning. First, the social planner solution, where some external
authority can assign each individual to some (or no) group, and the individual
is obliged to join. Second, the ‘open access’ case, in which whoever wants
to join a group is free to do it, provided he or she pays the dues. Third,
the ‘restricted access’ case, in which the admission of a new individual into
a group must be agreed upon by a majority of the members.
We study the case in which only one group can be formed. Though cer-
tainly restrictive, this assumption is made because we are interested in un-
derstanding the impact of inequality in settings in which individuals with
di¤erent income cannot perfectly ‘segregate’ themselves into homogeneous
income groups. On the other hand, it is not too irrealistic to think that
this assumption may apply to some communities (e.g., villages) whose small
scale does not allow for the coexistence of many groups of the same type.
The extension of our results to the case of multiple groups is discussed in
section 2.3.
Unless otherwise stated, all proofs are in appendix A.
42.1 Setup
Consider a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed on the interval
[0;1] and ranked according to their income (or wealth) yi so that the poorest
individual has index 0 and the richest 1.3 We denote the initial income
distribution by fyig. Each individual can choose whether or not to participate
in a group which provides an excludable good to its members. This good is
consumed in the same (…xed) quantity by all and only the members of the
group. Let H be the set of individuals who join the group. The total cost
of providing the good is assumed to be …xed and equal to C: This cost is





The tax rate is assumed to be exogenous and, from the above expression, is





In order to abstract from the free-rider problem, we assume that individ-
ual wealth is observable and that whoever does not pay the fee tyi cannot
have access to the services provided by the group. Also, in what follows we
exclude the possibility of side payments among individuals.
Everyone has the same preferences, represented by the continuous utility
function u(¢). We assume that the quality of the good provided by the group
is the same for every member and is decreasing in the size of the group, say
because of congestion. Let H indicate the size of the group, with a slight
abuse of notation. We assume that the ‘reduced form’ utility function u(H)
is continuously di¤erentiable and that
3In the theoretical section, we will interchangeably refer to income and wealth; when
turning to the empirics, however, the distiction will be made clear.
4All our qualitative results hold under a more general tax schedule t(i), as long as t(¢)
is strictly increasing in i. While particularly convenient from an analytical point of view,
the assumption of a proportional tax can be motivated, for example, by the existence of
informational contraints which prevent the use of more complex tax schemes. In section
2.3 we will discuss the consequences of the adoption of a lump-sum tax instead of a
proportional tax.
5For a model in which the tax rate is endogenously determined by voting, see Roberts
(1977).
5(A1) u0(H) < 0; u00(H) · 0:
Assumption (A1) says that utility decreases at an increasing rate with
group size, i.e. for a small group the addition of one more member has a
negative but small impact on the quality of the services provided; when the
group becomes very large, however, each additional member induces a larger
and larger decrease in quality, hence in utility.6
Any individual who does not join the group gets a reservation utility u.
Both the assumption that u(H) is independent of i and the assumption
that the reservation utility u is the same for everyone may seem unrealistic.
For the sake of parsimony, we choose to concentrate all wealth e¤ects in the
cost of participation, tyi, but we could obtain analogous results by letting
the gross bene…ts from participation and/or the outside option vary across
individuals with di¤erent wealth. All we really need in the following analysis
is some monotone relationship between the bene…t from participation in ex-
cess of individual contribution and reservation utility on the one hand, and
individual wealth on the other.
The net utility from participation for an individual j belonging to the set
of participants H is de…ned as




2.1.1 The social planner solution
As a benchmark, we start by considering what group composition and size
would be chosen by a benevolent social planner who maximizes aggregate
















Under our assumption that the distribution of the i’s is uniform on [0;1],t h e
above problem simpli…es to:
max
0·H·1
fu(H)H + u(1 ¡ H)g
6In general, we can think that initially there may be utility gains, rather than losses,
from having more people in the group, and that congestion would take place only beyond
a certain group size. We choose to ignore this possibility and to incorporate all positive
e¤ects if increased group size through the cost reduction channel.
6Notice that the social planner does not care about who participates in the
group. Any ‘unbalance’ in the relative wealth of the members translates into
a redistribution of the costs from some members to others, which is a wash in
the objective function of the planner. Proposition 1 characterizes the solution
to the optimization problem. We …rst introduce two assumptions.7
(A2) u(0) > u
(A3) u0(1) + u(1) < u
Proposition 1 Under assumptions (A2)-(A3), the social planner will select





¤) ¡ u: (3)
Proof. Straightforward from continuous di¤erentiability of u(¢),g i v e n
(A2)-(A3). ¤
Intuitively, the social planner will add people to the group until the
marginal loss from increased congestion (left hand side of (3)) equals the
marginal bene…t from participation (right hand side).
2.1.2 Open access group
Consider next the case where the participation decision is decentralized and
anyone is allowed to join the group, with or without the consent of the
other members. We will call this the ‘open access’ group. In this case, the
equilibrium size of the group must be self-enforcing, in the sense that all
and only the individuals who obtain a positive net bene…t from participating
are in the group. This is captured in our de…nition of an open access (OA)
equilibrium:
De…nition 1 Ag r o u pH is an OA equilibrium if the following two condi-
tions hold:
(i) no j 2 H wishes to leave H;
(ii) no j= 2 H wishes to join H.
7Assumptions (A2) and (A3) are necessary and su¢cient conditions for the existence
of an interior solution to the social planner’s problem, which is the only type of solution
of interest to us.
7The above de…nition amounts to saying that group H will be formed by





yj ¸ u (4)
Proposition 2 In an OA equilibrium the group is formed by the poorest





yh = u (5)
In what follows we will often refer to h¤ as the ‘marginal’ member or
participant. Proposition 2 is a consequence of the fact that when individual
contributions increase with wealth, as under a proportional income tax, the
net utility from participation is higher for the poorer members than for the
richer ones. In fact the bene…t from a given level of congestion is the same
for everyone (…rst addendum on the left hand side of (4)), while the cost is
higher for richer people (second addendum). There is a threshold level h¤
beyond which the burden of …nancing group activities would be too heavy
for the richest individuals to bear, and they prefer to stay out of the group.
All we need to know to predict group size is then the identity of the last
richest member, which is the h¤ solution of (5).
Notice that while the optimal size for the social planner, H¤,d i dn o t
depend on the distribution of income, the self-enforcing equilibrium size h¤
does. This point will be addressed in the next section. For the time being,
we turn to a third concept of equilibrium.
2.1.3 Restricted access group
Consider now the case where the members can regulate access to the group,
e¤ectively preventing someone from joining or expelling a member they no
longer want. We will maintain the assumption that the act of joining must
be voluntary, i.e. the group can decrease its size without the consent of the
involved party, but cannot increase it unless the new member agrees to join.
Decisions within the group are taken by majority rule. Note that since
for given group size individual preferences are strictly monotone in individual
8income, the median income member is decisive. The extensive form of the
game can be described as follows.
1. An initial group H0 is given.8
2. The individual who has the median income among the members of the
group proposes a new group H1:
3. A majority vote is taken by the members of H0 on the proposal H1:
4a. If a majority votes against H1; the original group H0 remains in place.
4 b .I fam a j o r i t yv o t e si nf a v o ro fH1; then:
4b_1. If all the new members of H1 accept to stay in the group, H1
replaces H0:
4b_2. If any member of H1 refuses to join, the original H0 is rein-
stated.
5 .T a x e sa r el e v i e do nt h em e m b e r so ft h e… n a lg r o u p( b ei tH0 or H1),
the good is provided to them, and the game ends.
We next de…ne our equilibrium concept under this restricted access (RA)
regime.
De…nition 2 Ag r o u pH0 is a RA equilibrium if the following two condi-
tions hold:
(i) no j 2 H0 wishes to leave H0;
(ii) H1 ´ H0, i.e. given the initial size and composition of the group, the
median income member does not propose to alter it.
The following consideration can help understand our de…nition of a RA
equilibrium. Note that any median member would always like to expel the
bottom half income members of an initial group H0 and include richer people
in their place, i.e. shift the composition of the group to the right: this way
congestion could be maintained the same and taxes decreased. In this e¤ort,
he would always be supported by the majority (the top half members). An
equilibrium is reached when the size and composition of the group is such
that: all the members get a higher utility from staying in the group than
from leaving (condition (i) in the de…nition); and no richer individual beyond
the current top income member would agree to join the group, so it is not
pro…table for the median member to propose a change (condition (ii)i nt h e
de…nition). Alternatively, an RA equilibrium can be seen as the group chosen
8We are not interested in how the original group is formed. One can think for example
of a random draw by nature, both in terms of size and of composition of the group.
9by a median member who maximizes his/her utility across the set of groups
all of which will have him/her as a member.
Notice that in this framework the median member is given one chance
to alter the composition of the group and then the game ends. In other
words, the median member does not have to worry about the fact that, if
group composition shifts right, in the following period he/she will no longer
be ‘median’ and the new decisive individual may choose to move even more
to the right, so that eventually the utility of the original median voter may
be lower than under the initial con…guration. While more satisfactory from
a dynamic point of view, the latter approach would yield a larger set of
equilibria. We choose therefore to adopt the seemingly more ‘myopic’ game
structure described in the text in order to get sharper predictions on the
equilibrium outcome. This way we obtain a ‘…xed point’ type of equilibrium,
in which group size and composition are optimal for the median member even
if he/she were free to alter it without risking ‘unraveling’ in the future. In
the terminology of Roberts (1999), who develops a fully dynamic framework
for voting equilibria in clubs, we are restricting our attention to an ‘extrinsic’
steady state.
Lemma 1 Any group that is a RA equilibrium must be a single interval.
Given the above lemma, the equilibrium can be found by choosing the
boundaries of a generic group [h1;h 2] so that the utility of the median voter
(h1 + h2)=2 within this group is maximized, provided that the participation
constraint holds for all the individuals in [h1;h 2]:9
max
0·h1<h2·1









yh2 ¸ u (7)
The solution to the problem is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Depending on the functional form of u(¢) and on the income
distribution fyig, in equilibrium the group can take one of two forms:
9Notice that in (7) we only write one constraint, namely that for the richest member h2.
In fact given that U(j) is strictly decreasing in yj for give group size, if the participation
constraint holds for h2, it will necessarily hold for any j 2 [h1;h 2]:
10Case A: [h¤
1;1]; where h¤
1 is the solution to
¡u
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yh2 = u (11)
where ¸ ¸ 0 is the multiplier on the participation constraint (7).
Case A describes an equilibrium in which the group is formed by the
richest segment of the population and the poorest [0;h ¤
1) individuals are left
out. In case B, instead, both the low and the top end of the income scale are
out of the group, the former because they are not allowed to join (though
they would like to), and the latter because they choose not to (the tax burden
is relatively too high for them). The group is thus formed by an intermediate
segment [h¤¤
1 ;h ¤¤
2 ] of the population.
Compared to the OA equilibrium, the possibility to exclude people from
the group generates a composition unbalanced in favor of the rich.A p o o r
member is always less desirable than a rich one because it generates the same
congestion and contributes less resources. A group that votes on its composi-
tion will always try to incorporate as many rich individuals as possible, that
is, it will try to push membership as ‘far to the right’ as possible, compatibly
with individual participation constraints.
112.2 Income distribution, group composition and size
Starting from the initial income distribution fyig, we now consider the e¤ects
of an increase in inequality taking the form of a redistribution of wealth
from the poor to the rich. In particular, we assume that the new income
distribution fe yig has the following characteristics:
(A4)
R 1
0 e yidi =
R 1
0 yidi
(A5) 8i<i 0, yi <y i0 =) e yi < e yi0
(A6) 9b i s.t. e yb i = yb i,a n de yi < (>)yi for all i<(>)b i
Assumption (A4) says that aggregate wealth is unchanged. Under (A5),
each individual maintains the same wealth ranking, i.e. if i was poorer than
i0 under the old distribution, the same will be true under fe yig. Finally, (A6)
says that there is some individual b i whose wealth is the same as under the
original income distribution, all the people in [0;b i) being poorer than before,
and all those in (b i;1] being richer.10
In the present context, in which only one group is formed, the aggregate
level of participation coincides with group size. Will participation, as mea-
sured by group size, be higher or lower under the more unequal distribution
of income? The answer to this question is straightforward if group formation
is in the hands of the social planner. In fact we have seen that the group size
chosen by the planner, H¤; is independent of the distribution of wealth. An
increase in inequality, therefore, will leave H¤ una¤ected. In this section, we
concentrate on the e¤ect of inequality in the two regimes of open access and
restricted access.
2.2.1 Inequality under open access
When anyone is free to join the group, the impact of increased inequality is
described by the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let h¤ be the solution to (5). An increase in inequality taking
10Of these assumptions, only (A4) is really needed: (A5) and (A6) are introduced to
ease exposition, but could be dispensed with. Suppose in fact that redistribution were
non-monotonic, in the sense that individual ranking under fe yig changed compared to that
under fyig. In this case, the arguments provided below could be applied in the same
way by simply re-sorting individuals in ascending wealth order and studying whether the
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Corollary 1 If (12) holds, the group that forms under fe yig is constituted by
the poorest [0;h 0] individuals, where h0 <h ¤.
Intuitively, the condition expressed in proposition 4 requires the relative
increase (decrease) in the wealth of the marginal member h¤ to be larger
(smaller) than the cumulative change in the wealth of the poorer members.
We have seen, in fact, that each individual’s incentive to join the group
depends on his/her relative wealth vis-a-vis that of the other participants.
Consider the case in which individual h¤ is richer under the new income dis-
tribution, i.e. e yh¤ >y h¤. In this case, (12) holds unambiguously because the
right-hand side is less than unity by construction. Individual h¤ is now ‘too
rich’, and the other members ‘too poor’, for h¤ to bene…t from participation.
If, on the other hand, e yh¤ <y h¤, it can be pro…table for h¤ to belong to the
group as long as he/she has become su¢ciently poor and e yh¤ is close to that
of the rest of the individuals in [0;h ¤), as depicted for example in …gure 1a. In
this case group size may actually increase with inequality, because the many
people who have become poor get comparable bene…ts from participation and
can gain by extending membership to decrease per-capita costs. Conversely,
if e yh¤ <y h¤ but (12) holds, as depicted for example in …gure 1b, participation
will be lower under the new distribution of income.
[Insert …gure 1]
To sum up, under open access an increase in income inequality has an
ambiguous e¤ect on group size, hence on participation. Roughly speaking,
the e¤ect is negative if the redistribution leads to more inequality in the
bottom part of the distribution; it can be positive if the redistribution bene…ts
few rich people at the expense of a large mass of poor people so that there is
relatively more equality at the bottom of the distribution. In all instances,
if participation does decrease, it is the relatively richer members who choose
to drop out. In the empirical section of this work, we will test all these
implications.
132.2.2 Inequality under restricted access
When access to the group can be regulated by its members, the e¤ect of
inequality on participation is even more ambiguous. In what follows we
discuss the results qualitatively.11 The formal analysis for case A is relegated
to Appendix A.12
Let us start by recalling the mechanisms underlying the choice of group
size under the initial distribution of income. An important element of the
analysis in section 2.1.3 was that, since the net bene…t from participation is
lower for richer members, ceteris paribus the ‘ideal’ group size is increasing in
individual wealth. In fact any increase in size brings the same congestion to all
the members, but generates greater savings for the richer ones through lower
tax rates. The equilibrium size chosen by the median voter is a compromise
between the relatively large group sizes desired by the top half members and
the relatively small ones preferred by the bottom half members. The key
factor for assessing the impact of increased inequality on equilibrium group
size will therefore be the new relative income of the median voter vis-a-vis
the rest of the group.
Consider …rst case A, where the group under the initial income distribu-
tion was constituted by [h¤
1;1]. By assumption (A4), under fe yig the aggregate
wealth of the individuals in [h¤
1;1] is higher. This means that, if group size
stayed the same, the tax rate required to cover the cost C would now be
lower. Loosely speaking13, if the median member (h¤
1 +1 ) =2 had the same
(or lower) wealth than before, as in …gure 2b, he would certainly be better
o¤ by reducing the level of congestion and choosing a smaller group size.
11If there are multiple equilibria, the conditions we derive on the impact of inequality on
participation must be intended to hold locally around each of the equilibria. In appendix
A, however, we show that, under mild su¢cient conditions on the shape of the income
distribution, the RA equilibrium type A is unique, hence for that case our conclusions
hold globally.
12A formal treatment of case B is not reported due to the large number of possibilities
arising from the fact that in case B nothing can be said a priori on the aggregate wealth
of group members under the new versus the old distribution of income. For this case, we
therefore choose to give a qualitative account of the possible ambiguities.
13Notice that in general the individual who was the median member under the initial
income distribution will no longer be the median member under fe yig.A l lw es a yi nw h a t
follows should be read as saying that if the same individual were still median, he or she
would no longer be optimizing by choosing the same group size, hence group size must
change, in one direction or the other.
14The initial group size could no longer be an equilibrium, and the new group
should be [h0
1;1],w i t hh0
1 >h ¤
1. If, on the other hand, the median voter had
become so rich to actually bene…t from further decreases in tax rates (see for
example …gure 2a), participation may actually increase and the new lower
bound h0
1 may be smaller than h¤
1.
[Insert …gure 2]
Consider now case B. Under the original income distribution, the group
was joined by the individuals in [h¤¤
1 ;h ¤¤
2 ], de…ned in proposition 3. No-
tice that in the initial equilibrium the richest member, h¤¤
2 ; was held at
the reservation utility u: Take the case where the original ‘median member’
(h¤¤
1 + h¤¤
2 )=2 is richer under fe yig; and thus wants to extend membership. If
the increase in h¤¤
2 ’s individual wealth is particularly high and the decrease in
the tax rate is not big enough, h¤¤
2 may actually drop out of the group. More
interestingly, contrary to case A where the total wealth of the participants is









1 yidi. This implies that if the group remained as before,
the tax rate should be higher and, unless h¤¤
2 had become substantially poor
and ‘close’ to the other members in wealth, his or her net utility would fall
below u. Under such circumstances, we would expect the relatively richer
members to drop out and group composition to shift left.
To sum up, in the RA equilibrium an increase in inequality may either
increase or decrease participation. Furthermore, in contrast with the OA
case in which any decrease in group size happens with the richer members
dropping out, in the RA case it can be the rich or the poor who leave the
group, depending on the shape of the income distribution.
2.3 Discussion and extensions
The analysis so far has assumed that only one group can be formed. A
…rst question is whether our results generalize to the case where multiple
groups can coexist. In this section we brie‡y address this question at the
qualitative level.14 Given the irrelevance of income distribution for the social
14An analytical treatment of the multiple group model goes beyond the scope of this
paper, also because for some of the groups considered in the empirical analysis (e.g., burial
societies, church groups, political groups) it is realistic to think that only one group can
form in a village. For the other groups, the theory will serve as a benchmark to analyize
the mechanisms underlying the impact of inequality on participation, with the caveat that
when multiple groups can form the results will generally be more ambiguous.
15planner solution, a change in inequality will not a¤ect the number and size
of groups even when this number can exceed one. The interesting cases are
the open access and the restricted access regimes. What makes the multiple
groups setting interesting in these cases is the possibility that more inequality
actually leads to an increase in participation by increasing the equilibrium
number of groups. In fact from the local public …nance - multicommunity lit-
erature we know that when heterogeneous agents can choose among multiple
‘jurisdictions’ they will stratify into homogeneous income groups (e.g., Epple
and Romer, 1991; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996). While we can expect the
results here obtained for a single group to hold within each of the multiple
groups, it is possible to get contradicting results in the aggregate. Take for
example the open access case, in which N groups will form starting at 0 until
some wealth level h beyond which no individual is part of any group. In this
case an increase in inequality will shift the composition of each group to the
left, and this may ‘free up’ some of the richer members so they can form an
N +1 th group including some j>h. Aggregate participation may in this
case be higher, rather than lower, even in the open access case.
Another assumption in the above analysis was that members paid a pro-
portional tax on income. This had two implications. The …rst was that
anyone could sustain the costs of joining a group, because by de…nition only
a fraction of their income was taken. The exclusion of poor people from
a group then crucially depended on the availability of a ‘restricted access’
technology, rather than on self-restraint. The second implication was that
for the whole group a richer individual was preferable to a poor one, because
he or she contributed more. This generated our ‘sorting’ result.
Suppose instead that group activities were …nanced through an exogenous
lump-sum tax, T. In this case a new constraint should be added to the
problem, namely that the individual can a¤ord paying the membership dues.
For every member i of a group of size H we must have yi ¸ T,i . e .yi ¸ C=H.
In the open access - single group case our result that the group is formed
by the poorest [0;h ¤] individuals would no longer hold. First of all, the very
poorest individuals may not be able to a¤ord the costs of participation if their
income is lower than T. Second, within the set of individuals whose income
exceeds T no prediction could be made on who exactly would join the group
and who would not. All the model could determine is an equilibrium group
size at which the net utility for any member exactly equals the reservation
level u: In this case the presence of heterogeneity in preferences and/or in
16individual outside options would deliver predictions on who should have an
incentive to join. For example, if individual outside options ui were increasing
in i, we could still predict that the group will be formed by an interval
[h0;h ¤], where the lower bound h0 is de…ned by the budget constraint yh0 =
C=(h¤ ¡h0) and the upper bound h¤ is de…ned by the indi¤erence condition
u(h¤ ¡ h0) ¡ C=(h¤ ¡ h0)=uh¤: In any case, it will still be true that if
participation decreases when inequality increases, it will be the relatively
richer people who stay out of the group.
The introduction of a lump-sum tax modi…es the analysis of the RA
group in a more substantial way. If fact, ceteris paribus, it is no longer true
that the median voter would be made better o¤ by a one time shift in the
composition of the group to the right. In fact, as long as an individual is
able to pay membership dues, everyone looks the same to the other group
members. Enriching the model with the possibility of idiosyncratic income
shocks, a limited liability argument may push in the direction that a rich
individual is relatively more ‘desirable’ than a poor one because he/she has
a higher probability of being able to pay the fee in the event of an adverse
shock.
A strong assumption of the theoretical framework presented in this paper
is the semi-linearity of the utility function, and in particular the fact that
income does not enter u(¢): Removing this assumption would certainly a¤ect
our results and bring risk-sharing into the picture. The impact of heterogene-
ity on group size and composition would then depend on the relative costs and
bene…ts of the insurance function of the group versus the local public good
provision. The analysis of group composition when individuals have hetero-
geneous risks in the context of group lending has been conducted, among the
others, by Ghatak (2000) and Sadoulet (1999). While the former predicts an
‘assortative matching’ result whereby groups are formed by individuals with
identical risks, the latter …nds conditions under which heterogeneous groups
form in which the less risky members of the group receive transfers from the
riskier ones.
Regarding the decision process in the restricted access model, we have
made the assumption ‘one head one vote’. Realistically, in many groups the
relatively richer individuals may have greater in‡uence (direct or indirect)
on the decisions. If this feature were incorporated in our analysis of RA
equilibrium, it would not undermine our conclusion, but simply reinforce the
possibility that an increase in inequality leads to an increase of participation,
17thus accentuating the di¤erence between the OA and the RA equilibria.
Finally, we choose to disregard the possibility that altruism may a¤ect
individual decisions to join groups (or to admit people into a group). Any
assumption in this direction would of course a¤ect our results.
Our model has highlighted some aspects of the link between inequality
and participation in groups. We may summarize our results in four main
points:
i) inequality has an ambiguous impact on participation;
ii) ceteris paribus, when inequality is higher we can expect the relatively
richer individuals to stay out of the groups, if they have relatively less to
gain;
iii) under open access, the impact of inequality depends on the shape of
the income distribution at the bottom;
iv) under restricted access, the impact of inequality depends on the shape
of the income distribution around the mean and the top.
In what follows we turn to the empirical analysis to try and shed light on
some of the ambiguities present in the theory and to test the predictions of
the model.
3 The data
T h ed a t aw ew i l lb eu s i n gc o m ef r o mt w or e c e n ts u r v e y sc o n d u c t e db yt h e
World Bank: the Tanzania Social Capital and Poverty Survey (SCPS) of
1995 and the Tanzania Human Resource Development Survey (HRDS) of
1993. The SCPS sampled 1376 rural households, asking a broad set of ques-
tions on group membership, group composition and performance, and also
on the values and degree of social ties in the community. For approximately
half of the households in the sample, data on demographic characteristics
and expenditure was also collected. An alternative source of information on
village-level aggregates is the HRDS: although the surveyed households may
be di¤erent, the clusters of the social capital survey are all comprised in this
latter, broader survey. Where useful to remedy the incomplete coverage of
the SCPS, this coincidence will be exploited. In this section, some descrip-
tive statistics from the SCPS will be presented to gain some insight into the
18di¤usion and characteristics of associational activity in our sample.15
[Insert table 1]
According to the SCPS, 72 percent of the individuals in the sample were
members of some group, the average number of groups per participant be-
ing 1.6. Table 1 lists the main types of groups, reporting the percentage
of the total sample who belong to the given group(s). We will classify the
various groups under three broad categories: (i) religious,s u c ha sc h u r c h e s
(joined by 15% of the respondents), Muslim groups and mosques (6%); (ii)
political (12%); and (iii) economic, including burial societies (12%), women’s
groups (5%), farmers’ groups (5%), cooperatives (2%), rotating credit asso-
ciations (1%), and dairy/cattle rearing groups (1%). The characteristics of
the di¤erent groups can be described with the help of table 2.16
[Insert table 2]
Panel A of the table contains information on the organizational rules of
the groups, while panel B summarizes the degree of heterogeneity of the
members. Starting from the top panel, for all categories of groups more than
half of the respondents report that they joined voluntarily. A signi…cant pro-
portion of memberships for religious groups occur by birth (36%); in the rest
of the cases members of political and economic groups are either required
to join (13% and 16%, respectively) or pay a fee (35% and 19%, respec-
tively). Approximately 39% of the respondents report that their groups are
supported by an external agency: in most cases, the agency is an NGO (39%
for religious, 40% for political, and 54% for economic groups), other relevant
funding sources being the government for political associations (53%) and
the church for religious ones (41%). Enforcement mechanisms vary among
the di¤erent categories: when there is a fee and members do not pay it,
chances of being expelled are high for political and economic groups (about
40%), while almost 80% of the members of religious associations report that
nothing happens.
15For a detailed description of the Tanzania Social Capital and Poverty Survey, the
reader is referred to Narayan (1997).
16The questions on group organizational structure listed in table 2 were mainly asked
to people who said they were members of the respective group.
19In panel B we turn to the degree of heterogeneity of the members in
terms of ethnic identity, type of economic activity, and income level. This
data di¤ers from the measures of heterogeneity we will use in the multivariate
analysis under two respects: (i) the …gures in table 2 refer to heterogeneity
within the group, while in our regressions we will link participation to het-
erogeneity in the whole village (as requested by the theory); (ii) the data in
table 2 comes from individual responses to questions directly aimed at as-
sessing homogeneity among group members. In the multivariate analysis, on
the contrary, we will construct measures of heterogeneity starting from the
primitives, i.e. from raw data on individual ethnicity, education, economic
activity, income and assets.
Regarding the ethnic composition of the groups, in the vast majority of
the cases, group membership is open to anyone: only for economic groups,
7% of the respondents say that the members all belong to the same clan or
tribe.17 Group members are also diverse in the type of activity on which they
earn their living. Approximately 78 to 87 percent of the respondents consider
the groups ‘mixed’ under this respect. Again, only for economic groups the
fraction reporting that ‘all’ (‘most’) members make a living in the same way
is signi…cant, namely 7% (14%). In a separate question, the same individuals
were asked whether the leaders of the groups made a living in a di¤erent way
f r o mt h er e s to ft h em e m b e r s :i nt h i sc a s e ,3 2t o3 4p e r c e n to ft h ep e o p l e
answered ‘yes’. Finally, all groups seem to aggregate people with di¤erent
income levels: only 1% of the respondents reported that the members were
all rich or all poor, and 15 to 29 percent —depending on the type of group—
said that there was little income diversity among the participants.
Overall, the evidence reported in panel B seems to suggest that the indi-
viduals in our sample do not sort into highly homogeneous groups. At least
in principle, therefore, there is scope for di¤erential incentive mechanisms
among relatively rich and relatively poor people, as stressed by the theory.
4E m p i r i c a l s t r a t e g y
The …rst model we will estimate relates the individual decision to participate
in a group to individual attributes as well as village-level variables, among
17The relative importance of ethnic a¢liation for this category of groups compared to
the others is not surprising, given that tribal links can enlarge the scope for reciprocity
and enforcement mechanisms in economic transactions (La Ferrara, 1997).
20which inequality. The structural equations underlying our estimates can
be presented as follows. The expected net bene…t from participation for





0Hv + ±Gv + "iv (13)
where Xiv is a vector of individual characteristics, such as age, sex, education,
and wealth; Hv is a vector of village characteristics, such as average wealth,
heterogeneity in education , in economics activity, in tribe, and income in-
equality; Gv measures income or assets inequality in village v,a n d"iv is an
error term normally distributed with mean 0 and variance ¾v: The vectors
¯;° and ± are parameters. We do not observe the ‘latent’ variable B¤
iv,b u t
only the choice made by the individual, which takes value 1 (participate) if
the expected net bene…t is positive, and 0 (not participate) otherwise:
Piv =1if B
¤
iv > 0 (14)
Piv =0if B
¤
iv · 0 (15)
The probit model (13)-(15) will be estimated, correcting for heteroskedastic-
ity and clustering of the residuals at the village level.
A potential concern with the above strategy is that inequality is measured
with error or that it is endogenous, in that higher participation may create
opportunities for the poor to advance and decrease inequality. To account
for this possibility, we estimate a linear probability model and instrument
inequality using geographical variables. The two-stage-least-squares model
estimated is in this case:
Piv = ¯
0Xiv + °
0Hv + ±Gv + "iv (16)
Gv = ¹
0Xiv + Ã
0Hv + ¸Zv + ´v (17)
where Piv is equal to 1 if individual i in village v is member of some group
and 0 otherwise; Xiv;H v and Gv are as above; Zv is a vector of instruments;
…nally, ¯;°;±;¹;Ã;¸ are vectors of parameters. The key assumption for the
two stage estimation of this linear probability model is that Zv is correlated
with Gv but uncorrelated with "iv:
After estimating the basic reduced form we will turn to a more speci…c
prediction of the model, namely that when inequality is higher, participation
21should be relatively less attractive for relatively richer people. To test this





0Hv + ±Gv + ³Aiv + »GvAiv + "iv (18)
where Aiv is the di¤erence between individual i’s assets and the average
in village v.A p o s i t i v e v a l u e o f Aiv characterizes a richer than average
individual. Our conjecture is that the sign on the interaction term between
Aiv and the inequality measure Gv should be negative. Since relative wealth
may capture some unobservable individual characteristics which in‡uence
participation regardless of the ‘relative bene…ts’ explanation proposed by the
theory, we shall try and sharpen our test by exploiting the di¤erence between
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ relative wealth. The latter test will be illustrated
below.
Regarding the role of the shape of the income distribution under di¤erent
access rules, we will test the predictions of our model by estimating the pro-
bit model (13)-(15) separately for OA and RA groups, and using inequality
measures with varying degrees of sensitivity to the lower vs. upper part of
the income distribution. According to our theoretical framework, the nega-
tive impact of inequality in open access groups should be best captured by
inequality indexes that put a lot of weight on heterogeneity in the lower part
of the distribution. The potential positive role of inequality in RA groups,
instead, should be best captured by measures that emphasize heterogeneity
in the middle and upper part of the distribution.
Finally, the last part of our empirical analysis will explore some issues
not directly linked to the model presented in this paper, but which we …nd
interesting and worth investigating given the richness of the data set. In
particular, we will examine how inequality relates to relevant group charac-
teristics, namely group composition and functioning. Variable de…nitions, as
well as summary statistics, are reported in appendix B.
5 Inequality and group membership
5.1 Basic regressions
Table 3 presents our estimates of the basic model. The dependent variable
is a dummy taking value 1 if the respondent –generally the head of the
household– is member of at least one group. The individual controls include:
22age, sex, and education of the respondent; household size, and a dummy
equal to one if the respondent has been living in the same village at least
for the past ten years. Individual wealth is measured through an ‘asset
index’ constructed in the survey by assigning predetermined weights to the
ownership of various durable consumption goods.18 The average of this index
at the village level, as well as the ‘size’ of the village in terms of population,
are included among the regressors to control for potential di¤erences in the
‘demand’ for participation across communities. Regional dummies are also
included.
The explanatory variables in which we are most interested are measures
of heterogeneity among residents in the village, and in particular:
i) inequality, measured with the Gini coe¢cient built from the assets
index of all respondents from the village;






kv k =1 ;:::;Kv (19)
where skv is the share of respondents in village v w h ob e l o n gt ot r i b ek,a n d
in each village there is a number Kv of di¤erent tribes. This index represents
the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in the same village
belong to di¤erent tribes;
iii) heterogeneity in economic activity, measured with an index analogous
to (19), where k denotes an individual’s economic activity rather than tribe;19
iv) heterogeneity in education, measured as the standard deviation of
the highest grade in school obtained by household heads interviewed in the
village.
Before commenting on our estimates, we should pause to discuss our
choice of the inequality variable. Self-reported household expenditure is also
available from the SCPS and HRDS and can be used to build income in-
equality measures. Similarly, the HRDS contains data on the number and
size of shambas (or gardens) owned by a household, and can be used to con-
18The durable consumption goods and weights used were the following: van or truck,
car, motorcycle, bicycle, sewing machine = 16, radio = 8, table = 6, bed, clock or watch
= 4, chair = 3, lamp = 2. If the asset was not working, these weights were approximately
halved.
19The most common activities are: working on own farm, government employee, self-
employed, and retired.
23struct an index of land inequality. We choose to employ asset inequality for
a variety of reasons. First of all, compared to income inequality, inequality
in assets is likely to be less endogenous, and a better measure of permanent
inequality in the village. Second, while land inequality may not su¤er from
the same endogeneity problem as income inequality, it is not clear that it
captures di¤erences in relative wealth: for example, an individual who solely
relies on farm labor and cultivates two shambas should not be considered
richer than a government employee who may not own a shamba. Finally,
there is much more variation in the Gini coe¢cient built from assets (min
= .16, max = .69, std. dev. = .11) than in the Gini built from expenditure
(min = .13, max = .44, std. dev. = .06) or from land (min = .24, max =
.68, std. dev. = .10). We have estimated all regressions using income and
land inequality in place of assets inequality, and our results were generally
similar in qualitative terms, though the coe¢cients on inequality were not
always signi…cant in statistical terms.20
[Insert table 3]
The …rst column of table 3 presents the baseline speci…cation of our probit
model, including individual and village controls but not heterogeneity mea-
sures. The age and sex of the respondent do not seem to matter very much,
while education has a positive and signi…cant impact on the probability of
being member of a group.21 Household size and the length of residence in
the village do not have a signi…cant impact on participation. On the other
hand, the size of the community in terms of population has a negative e¤ect
on participation rates, though not always statistically signi…cant at conven-
tional levels. Average wealth in the village is positively associated with group
membership, suggesting that participation may be a ‘normal good’.22
In column 2 we introduce various measures of heterogeneity at the village
level. Neither tribal fractionalization nor heterogeneity in education turn
out to be signi…cant in our regression. The diversity of economic activities
–which might be relevant for the ‘consumption’ interpretation– is also not
20Results are available from the authors.
21As will be clear from columns 3 and 4, this e¤ect is partly due to the fact that education
here proxies for individual wealth, not included among the regressors.
22We must be careful in interpreting this link in a causal sense, given that higher wealth
in the community might be a consequence (rather than a cause) of higher levels of social
capital (see Narayan and Pritchett, 1999).
24signi…cant: one possible reason is that there is not much variation in this
variable: almost 84 percent of the respondents belong to the same category,
i.e. ‘farmers’. On the contrary, the estimated coe¢cient on ‘Gini’ is negative
and signi…cant at the 1 percent level: increased inequality in one’s village
has a negative e¤ect on the likelihood that somebody will join a group.B a s e d
on the marginal coe¢cients of the probit model in table 3, an increase in
‘Gini’ by one standard deviation decreases the probability of participating
in a group by about 4 percentage points. This is quite a sizeable e¤ect
if compared to the other determinants of participation: for example, it is
almost three times the e¤ect of one more year of education.
In the last two columns we consider non linear e¤ects of individual in-
come on participation. This is partly to verify that our results on inequality
are not a statistical artifact. In fact, if the relationship between individual
income and group participation were concave and we omitted nonlinear in-
come terms from the speci…cation, we may …nd a negative and signi…cant
coe¢cient on Gini even if inequality per se were not a determinant of par-
ticipation.23 In this case, adding nonlinear income terms to the regression
should wipe out the e¤ect of inequality. We can see from column 3 that,
when introduce individual assets and its square, Gini retains a negative and
signi…cant coe¢cient. The coe¢cients on individual assets suggest that the
relationship between individual wealth and participation is increasing and
concave. Finally, in column 4 we further explore nonlinearities by introduc-
ing two dummies that indicate whether the respondent belongs to the …rst
or the last wealth quartile. We …nd that they have, respectively, a nega-
tive and a positive coe¢cient, though not highly signi…cant. On the other
hand, the coe¢cient on inequality is quite robust and fairly stable in all these
speci…cations.
5.2 Instrumenting Gini
Before proceeding with more speci…c tests of our theory, we need to deal
with the potential endogeneity of the variable Gini and with the possibility
of measurement error. In fact, we may conjecture that a high degree of par-
ticipation may reduce inequality by generating opportunities of advancement
for the poor in terms of education, di¤usion of information, public good pro-
23This point has been discussed in the health economics literature when assessing the
impact of income inequality on health outcomes (Gravelle, 1998).
25vision, etc. Also, villages prone to social activities may have higher levels
of risk-sharing, which would attenuate the di¤erences in expenditure among
t h e i rm e m b e r s( t h o u g ht h i sw o u l db el e s so fac o n c e r ni fw eh a dar e l i a b l e
measure of permanent wealth). Finally, we want to account for the possibility
of measurement error for the variable Gini.
To address the above problems, we estimate a linear probability model
using two-stage-least-squares, and instrumenting Gini with demographic con-
trols and with the following geographic variables:
(i) the average precipitation in the ‘critical month(s)’, i.e. in those months
of the growing season in which scarcity of rain can jeopardize the harvest the
most.24 The critical months were identi…ed by looking at the patterns of
rain in the di¤erent regions, e.g. unimodal versus bimodal (Gommes and
Houssiau, 1982), and by checking the calendars for the relevant crops. Given
that agriculture is the main activity in rural Tanzania, we expect to …nd
a negative relationship between this measure of rain and inequality in the
village;
(ii) rainfall variability, i.e. the standard deviation of the monthly pre-
cipitation during the year. The higher this variability, the more vulnerable
to shocks should be people who rely on farming to earn a living, hence the
higher inequality;
(iii) average temperature during the year (in C degrees);
(iv) temperature variability, i.e. the standard deviation of monthly tem-
perature.
(v) median distance of village households from the livestock market;
(vi) median distance of village households from the market for farm prod-
ucts;
(vii) a dummy for villages located in touristic areas, e.g. Kilimanjaro or
other national parks, which plausibly have prospects for higher earnings by
af e wp e o p l e .
The coe¢cients of the …rst stage regression of Gini on the above variables
a r ep r e s e n t e di nt a b l e4 .
[Insert table 4]
24The only year for which we could …nd monthly precipitation data minute by minute
is 1987. Despite the lag between the year of the social capital survey and 1987, the latter
is recognized as a ‘typical’ year in terms of precipitation (Gommes and Petrassi, 1994),
and should therefore be adequate to relate to ‘permanent’ wealth as measured by asset
ownership.
26All the geographic variables have the expected sign, and many of them
are statistically signi…cant at conventional levels. The adjusted R-square of
the regression is .40.
When the predicted value of inequality is used in the second stage (third
column of table 4), the coe¢cient on Gini remains negative and signi…cant,
and larger in absolute value than that of the linear probability model with-
out instrumentation (…rst column). This seems to suggest that our concerns
about reverse causation are not warranted empirically and suggests the pres-
ence of attenuation bias to some degree, as it would be produced by an OLS
model in which Gini were measured with error. However, the Hausman test
fails to reject the joint null of weak exogeneity and no measurement error in
Gini. Also, notice from table 4 that according to the Sargan overidenti…cation
test our instruments are valid.
5.3 Di¤erential impact of inequality for the rich and
the poor
An important question is whether the negative e¤ect of inequality on par-
ticipation holds across households with di¤erent wealth levels, or rather if
there is a systematic tendency for richer (or poorer) individuals to drop out
of groups when inequality increases. This question is addressed in table 5.
[Insert table 5]
In the …rst column table 5 the di¤erence between the asset index of the
respondent’s household and the village average is included among the regres-
sors. This variable measures how much richer (or poorer, if the variable takes
a negative value) than the average neighbors the respondent is. An interac-
tion term between this di¤erence and the Gini coe¢cient is also included, to
see if increased inequality has a di¤erential impact on the participation of
those people who are above (or below) the average.
The coe¢cient on ‘Assets above average’ shows that, ceteris paribus,i n -
dividuals from richer households are more likely to be members of some
group.25 The negative coe¢cient on the interaction term, however, shows
25Due to the potential endogeneity problem, it is questionable that this link can be
interpreted in a causal sense. Two considerations can be made to reduce the importance
of the reverse causality argument here. First, the bene…ts of participation may be ‘social’
rather than ‘individual’ (Narayan and Pritchett, 1999). Second, our assets index refers to
the entire household, and not just to the individual who participates.
27that it is precisely the ‘richer than average’ who are less likely to join or
stay in groups when inequality increases. Our interpretation for this result
is that the economic gains from participation are asymmetric and that when
low-income households become poorer and high-income ones become richer,
the latter have less to gain from joining a group. This is quite plausible for
groups such as, for example, burial societies or women’s groups, where the
gains from participation are not proportional to individual wealth and where
the rich have less to gain from participating relative to the poor.26
One may argue that relative wealth captures some unobservable indi-
vidual characteristics that a¤ect participation independently of the ‘relative
bene…ts’ that can be obtained from the group. In the next two columns
we address this concern by exploiting the nature of ‘Participatory Poverty
Assessment’ of the SCPS. In addition to collecting information on asset own-
ership, this survey asked each respondent to rank his or her household on a
scale from 1 to 5, 1 being ‘very poor’, 2 ‘poor’, 3 ‘average’, 4 ‘rich’, and 5
‘very rich’. Separately, a mixed group of people from the village was asked
to agree on a de…nition for the …ve categories and then rank themselves and
the households included in the survey sample according to those categories.27
Using this information, we build a measure of ‘subjective overestimation’ by
subtracting the score assigned by the evaluation group from the score self-
assigned by the respondent. A positive value of this variable indicates that
the respondent perceives him or herself richer than the community does, and
vice versa for a negative value.
We therefore estimate the same speci…cation as in column 1, splitting
the sample between people who underestimate or correctly rank themselves
(column 2), and people who overestimate themselves (column 3). The coef-
…cients on the individual controls and on average village assets are similar
between the two sub-samples; those on inequality, instead, are remarkably
di¤erent. In particular, the negative e¤ect of inequality on participation only
holds for those people who overestimate their rank. The coe¢cients on ‘Assets
above average’ and on the interaction term with ‘Gini’ do not signi…cantly
di¤er from zero for the sub-sample of ‘underestimators or neutral’, while they
26This evidence is consistent with other empirical studies of the determinants of col-
lective action (e.g., Gaspart et al., 1997), which show that participation —in the form of
labor contribution to the provision of a public good— is higher for those individuals who
can expect to bene…t relatively more from the public good.
27The group evaluation process is described in Narayan (1997), ch.2. For an empirical
analysis of the determinants of subjective welfare, see Ravallion and Lokshin (1998).
28do for the sub-sample of ‘overestimators’. In other words, people whose ob-
jective wealth is higher than average do not respond to increased inequality
di¤erently from poorer individuals if they underestimate or correctly esti-
mate their relative wealth. On the contrary, people whose objective wealth
is higher than average and who believe to be even richer than they are,
respond to increased inequality by participating less.
Our interpretation of these results is the following. Each individual’s
decision to be part of a group depends on the expected net bene…t from
membership. Controlling for all other relevant factors, two individuals with
the same wealth should have the same objective bene…ts and costs from
participating. If one of them believes to be richer than he or she actually
is relative to the rest of the village, and the other believes to be poorer,
the divergence in their reaction to increased inequality could be due to the
conviction that richer people have less to gain from participating in groups
with poorer people. Both individuals in our thought experiment have the
same wealth. The one who overestimates his or her rank believes that when
inequality increases he or she will be relatively richer than the other potential
members of the group and will have less to gain, hence stays out. The
other one does the opposite.28 The plausibility of this interpretation will be
reinforced in section 6, where the analysis is conducted separately for di¤erent
kinds of groups from which rich and poor people have di¤erent bene…ts.
5.4 Skewedness of the income distribution and access
rules
We next investigate the relationship between the shape of the distribution
of wealth and the impact of inequality under di¤erent access rules. In the
top panel of table 6, our dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the
respondent belongs to and open access group (church, Muslim, and political
groups) and 0 otherwise. In the bottom panel, the dependent variable takes
the value 1 if the respondent is a member of a restricted access group (burial
28Another possible interpretation is that the selection into either sub-sample is endoge-
nous, e.g. it is because they are not part of any group that the wealth of individuals
belonging to the second sub-sample is underestimated by the evaluation team. In order
for this objection to be compelling, one should argue that the bias in the team’s evaluation
of those who are not members of any group is systematically in the direction of underes-
timating their wealth. However, it is very likely that such a bias, if it exists, would go in
t h eo p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n .
29society, women’s group, farmers’, dairy/cattle rearing group, coop, rosca) and
0 otherwise. Explanatory variables include individual and village controls,
plus various measures of inequality. The idea is to exploit the fact that
di¤erent measures are sensitive to di¤erent parts of the income distribution,
to link our results to the predictions of the theory.
[Insert table 6]
The …rst column of table 6 reports the marginal probit coe¢cient on asset
inequality when the inequality index used is the Generalized Entropy with
parameter equal to 2. This measure is very sensitive to wealth di¤erences at
the top of the distribution but not at the bottom. As we can see, in the bot-
tom panel of the table it has a positive and signi…cant coe¢cient, while in the
top panel it is negative and not signi…cant. A similar pattern obtains when
the Gini coe¢cient is used (column two). Gini is in fact most sensitive to dif-
ferences around the median. These …ndings are consistent with the analysis
of section 2.2.2, where we showed that inequality can increase participation
in restricted access groups if there are signi…cant income disparities in the
middle and top part of the distribution (see …gure 2a).
In the third and fourth column of table 6, instead, we use inequality
measures very sensitive to the bottom part of the distribution, namely the
Atkinson index (with parameter 2) and the standard deviation of the loga-
rithm of assets. The results are now quite di¤erent: inequality is no longer
signi…cant in RA groups, while it has a negative and signi…cant impact on
participation in open access groups. This is consistent with the analysis in
section 2.2.1, where we showed that increased inequality lowers participation
if there are su¢cient disparities in the lower part of the distribution (see
…gure 1b).
Another way to read these results is to look at table 6 by row. In OA
groups (top panel) we fail to capture the negative impact of inequality if we
use measures that do not discriminate su¢ciently between situations where
‘the poor are all poor’ and situations where relevant di¤erences exist within
the bottom quintiles. We capture instead this impact when we use measures
like Atkinson and the Standard Deviation of Logs. In RA groups (bottom
panel), on the other hand, we capture the positive e¤ect of inequality on
participation when we use inequality measures which are sensitive to di¤er-
ences around the middle and top parts of the distribution, but we don’t get
signi…cant results with the other measures. Having an accurate measure of
30the skewedness of the income distribution seems to matter to understand the
di¤erential impact of inequality on participation by the rich and the poor.29
6 Inequality and group characteristics
Finally, we address the question of whether inequality is systematically asso-
ciated with certain characteristics of the groups, both in terms of composition
and in terms of functioning. Table 7 presents the probit marginal coe¢cients
from a set of regressions of various group characteristics on assets inequal-
ity, controlling for average assets in the village, heterogeneity in schooling
and in economic activity, and tribal fractionalization. Each row in the table
refers to a di¤erent dependent variable (all dummies, listed on the left), and
each column to a di¤erent type of group (listed on top). Each cell therefore
reports the coe¢cient on ‘Gini’ from a separate regression.30
The types of groups considered are: religious (church, mosque, or Muslim
group), political, and …ve of the most widespread ‘economic’ groups: burial
societies, women’s groups, farmers’ associations, cooperatives and rotating
saving and credit associations (ROSCAs). Burial societies are essentially
a means of pooling resources to organize and pay for unexpected expenses
such as funerals. There is in general only one burial society in a village,
so that if rich and poor people want to participate, they will be members
of the same society. While there are no fees, all members are supposed to
pay and provide labor when someone dies. For this reason, we can think
that poor people have relatively more to gain than rich people from being
members in a burial society. Women’s groups can serve a variety of functions.
Some of them are essentially political organizations, others serve religious
or social purposes, others still serve economic functions. Among these are
microenterprise activities such as tree planting, beer brewing, and credit
29A similar pattern emerges when a single index is used (e.g. the Generalized Entropy
or the Atkinson index) varying the values of the parameters. Results are available from
the authors.
30In general, the questions on group composition and functioning of the di¤erent groups
were asked only to those individuals who reported that they were members of those par-
ticular groups. Compared to the sample used for the membership regressions, those in-
dividuals who do not belong to any group are left out, while those who belong to more
than a group are asked the same questions more than once. Each data point used in the
regressions is therefore the assessment of one member of the relevant type of group in the
village.
31provision.31 Again, the possibility to take part in this kind of activities
is relatively less appealing for people at the top end of the income scale.
Farmers’ associations deal with agricultural production and fertilizers, and
as such can comprise both rich and poor members. Finally, cooperatives
and Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) serve the usual
functions described in the literature.
[Insert table 7]
The top half of table 7 shows the impact of inequality on group compo-
sition. In villages with higher inequality group members are generally more
likely to belong to the same clan or tribe (row 1). They are also more likely
to make a living in the same way (row 2) and less likely to be from a mixed
income group (row 4), suggesting that when inequality increases people tend
to sort into more homogeneous groups. It should be noted that these e¤ects
are signi…cant in particular for burial societies, women’s groups, cooperatives
and ROSCAs, i.e. those groups where the ‘rich’ have less to gain if the rest
of the members become ‘poorer’. For these groups the likelihood that the
“members are all poor” is in fact higher the higher the inequality in the vil-
lage (row 5). These …ndings are consistent with the interpretation on the
di¤erential impact of inequality for rich and poor people given above.
In the bottom half of table 7 group composition is taken as given and the
question asked is: does higher inequality harm the functioning of a group
in any way? Various aspects of group functioning are considered. First of
all, in more unequal communities people are less likely to respond that de-
cisions are taken by vote (row 6). There seems to be a tendency towards
hierarchic decision-making, especially in those groups —political and farm-
ers’ associations— where both rich and poor members coexist. This is of
particular interest when evaluating the e¤ect of inequality on ‘participation’
because, although this e¤ect may not show up as a decrease in raw member-
ship numbers, the nature of the groups may still be not very ‘participatory’.
Also, when inequality is higher members feel less “encouraged to participate”
(row 7), again especially in religious and political groups, where members
with di¤erent levels of wealth coexist.
When asked to evaluate the functioning of their groups, people living
in villages with higher inequality are less likely to report that it is “good”
31The source of the information on burial societies and women’s groups is Narayan
(1997), p.56.
32or “excellent” (row 8), although this relationship is statistically signi…cant
only for religious and political groups. Members of political groups tend to
report that the disadvantage from participating in the group is that they are
“misinformed” (row 9) when inequality is higher, consistently with the less
democratic decision process noted above. On the other hand, for members
of burial societies and women’s group the main disadvantage seems to be
bad economic management (row 10), e.g. misappropriation of funds by some
member or unpro…table activities.
In villages with more income disparities, the likelihood that membership
has increased in the past four years (row 11) is lower, which may be seen
as an implicit assessment of bad performance. Finally, in more unequal
areas groups themselves interact less frequently (row 12). The fact that
the negative impact of inequality on many aspects of group functioning is
especially signi…cant for burial societies and women’s groups is of particular
concern because it reveals a potentially perverse e¤ect of inequality on groups
that are already comprised of low-income individuals.
Similar results obtain when one looks at other dimensions of ‘social cap-
ital’, such as trust and con‡ict. In particular, ceteris paribus individuals
living in more unequal villages are less likely to trust others and more likely
to report that there is a high degree of con‡ict in the community.32
7 Conclusions
The impact of group participation on economic performance has received in-
creasing attention in the literature. This paper has attempted to understand
the determinants of group membership and how groups function by looking
at the role of heterogeneity, and in particular of income inequality. Using
household level data from rural Tanzania, we have addressed four categories
of questions.
First, does more inequality lead to less membership in groups? The an-
swer we have suggested is ‘yes’. Ceteris paribus, individuals living in villages
with higher inequality in assets are less likely to be members of groups, and
this result is robust to instrumentation of inequality with geographical vari-
ables.
Second, does inequality have a di¤erent impact on the decision to par-
ticipate for poor and rich people? We have shown that when inequality
32These results are available from the authors.
33increases, the decline in membership is higher for people who are wealthier
than their village average. Furthermore, holding individual wealth constant,
this e¤ect is particularly signi…cant for those people who overestimate their
relative income rank.
Third, we ask if the shape of the income distribution matters depending
on the access rules to the group. We provide suggestive evidence that in-
equality has a negative impact on participation in open access groups when
there are wide disparities in the bottom part of the distribution, while it can
actually increase participation in restricted access groups when the dispari-
ties are wider around the median (and the mean) of the distribution.
Fourth, we explore what group characteristics are associated with higher
inequality. In terms of group composition, we …nd that individuals living
in more unequal villages tend to sort into homogeneous income groups. In
terms of decision making and group functioning, we …nd that when inequality
increases: decisions are less likely to be taken by vote; members feel less
encouraged to participate, and they are more likely to report poor group
performance and misuse of funds.
Though far from de…nitive, the evidence presented seems certainly sugges-
tive and calls for a deeper investigation of the mechanisms through which het-
erogeneity and inequality a¤ect individual incentives to participate in groups.
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Appendix A
Proof of proposition 2
The …rst part of the proposition says that the group is formed by an interval
of people, and in particular by the poorest [0;h] individuals. This follows
from the fact that, for given group size, the left-hand side of (4) is decreasing
in yj,h e n c ei nj. Therefore if (4) is satis…ed for some j 2 (0;1), then it must
be satis…ed for all j0 <j .
The second part of the proposition gives the equilibrium size of the group,
i.e. the ‘identity’ of the richest individual in the group. The equilibrium value
of h must be such that the participation constraint is binding, thus it must
solve (5). Whether the solution to (5) is unique depends on the functional
form of u(¢), as well as on the distribution of yi: We can gain some insights

















An increase in h has three e¤ects on the net utility of the hth individual.
First of all, the quality of the good provided by the group is lower because of
increased congestion, hence utility is lower (…rst addendum on the right-hand
side of (A.1)). Second, for given tax rate, the cost paid by the hth individual
is higher because his or her wealth is higher (second term on the right-hand
side). Finally, for given income level, the tax rate is lower because the …xed
cost C is divided among more members (third addendum in (A.1)). The sign
of (A.1) will be positive if and only if this last ‘tax rate e¤ect’ (positive) is
stronger than the ‘congestion’ and ‘taxable income’ e¤ects (negative).
37It is easy to show that for h ! 0 the tax rate e¤ect prevails, hence it is
optimal to increase the size of the group beyond 0.F o rh ! 1, on the other
hand, two possibilities arise. The …rst, relatively uninteresting, is that the
tax rate e¤ect still prevails over the others so that U(h) is still increasing in h
and the only stable group is the whole population. The second possibility is
that for large group sizes the congestion and taxable income e¤ects prevail, so
that (A.1) evaluated at 1 is negative. In this case there will be two solutions
to (5), hA and hB,w h e r ehA <h B.H o w e v e r , o n l y hB is stable.D u e t o
U0(hA) > 0, in fact, if one increased in…nitesimally the size of the group
to hA + " the participation constraint would still be met for the (hA + ")th
individual. The latter would be strictly better o¤ by joining the group than
by staying outside, hence group size would increase. This holds as long as
h’s net utility is above u, i.e. until the richest member is the second root
of (5), hB,w h e r eU0(hB) < 0: In the text we concentrate only on the stable
equilibrium and refer to hB simply as h¤. ¤
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose not, e.g. H is the union of two intervals [h1;h 2] [ [h3;h 4],w h e r e
0 · h1 <h 2 <h 3 <h 4 · 1. Note that since (4) is satis…ed for the individuals
in [h3;h 4], then it must be satis…ed for those in (h2;h 3), i.e. any individual
in this interval would accept to join. Let b j be the median income member of
group H.I fb j 2 [h3;h 4]; then all individuals in [b j;h4] —a majority— would
be better o¤ by keeping group size the same and exchanging some low income
members [h1;b h) for members in [b h;h3),w h e r eh1 < b h<h 3. In fact congestion
would be the same but per capita taxes would be lower. Ifb j 2 [h1;h 2]; then all
individuals in [b j;h2][[h3;h 4] —a majority— would be better o¤ by keeping
group size the same and exchanging some low income members [h1;b h) for
members in [h2;h 3),w h e r eh1 < b h<h 2 and b h ¡ h1 = h3 ¡ h2. Therefore H
cannot be a RA equilibrium. ¤
Proof of proposition 3
Let ¸ ¸ 0 indicate the multiplier on the constraint (7), and ¹ ¸ 0 the



















































=0 ;¸ ¸ 0; [¢] ¸ 0; (A.4)
with complementary slackness.
¹(1 ¡ h2)=0 ;¹ ¸ 0; (1 ¡ h2) ¸ 0; (A.5)
with complementary slackness.
Claim 1:E i t h e rh2 =1 ,o r¸>0; or both.
Proof of Claim 1. By contradiction. Suppose h2 < 1 and ¸ =0 , i.e.
U(h2) > u. Then the median member would be strictly better o¤ in the
group [h1+";h2+"], " ! 0+. In other words, the median voter can maintain
the same congestion and save on taxes by excluding the poorest member
and extending membership to the individual immediately richer than h2.
By continuity of U(¢); the latter will have a net bene…t no lower than u,
hence will accept to join the group. Therefore the initial group was not an
equilibrium. ¤
Case A in the text is obtained by substituting in the …rst order conditions
respectively, h2 =1and ¸ =0 . Case B is obtained by setting U(h2)=u
and ¹ =0 . The two cases are used as extreme exempli…cations, but are not
necessarily exclusive.
Notice that, while in general it is di¢cult to establish uniqueness in case
B, for case A there is a simple su¢cient condition. The partial derivative of





i.e. when the distribution of income is su¢ciently skewed to the right. Under
this condition, if an equilibrium h¤
1 exists, it is unique.
Proof of proposition 4
The mass of members will be smaller than [0;h ¤] if and only if the individual
who was the marginal member under fyig —i.e. the h¤ de…ned by (5)— will
drop out when the distribution becomes fe yig. In fact assumption (A5) and
monotonicity of U(j) guarantee that if h¤ does not participate, no j>h ¤


























Given that individual h¤ was held at the reservation utility u under the initial
distribution, for yi > 0; 8i, a necessary and su¢cient condition for h¤ to stay
out of the group is that the above expression is negative, i.e. that (12)
holds. ¤
The impact of inequality under restricted access
For case A, where the initial group composition before the redistribution of
income is [h¤
1;1], we can establish the following.
Claim:A ni n c r e a s ei ni n e q u a l i t yt a k i n gt h ef o r md e s c r i b e di n( A 4 ) - ( A 6 )


























Proof. Follows from (8), observing that ¡u0(1¡h1) is monotone decreasing
in h1.
Notice that under mild su¢cient conditions on the shape of the new
income distribution, participation unambiguously decreases when e y(h¤
1+1)=2 <
40y(h¤
1+1)=2; i.e. when the original median income member is poorer under the
new distribution.33 That is the situation represented in Figure 2b.
Appendix B
B.1: Variable de…nitions
Age: Age of respondent (years). Source: SCPS
Assets above avg: Indiv assets - Avg assets in village. Source: SCPS
Atkinson (2): Atkinson inequality measure, parameter=2, computed
from Indiv assets. Source: SCPS
Avg assets in village: mean of Indiv assets in village. Source: SCPS
Decision by vote: dummy = 1 if decisions in the group taken by vote.
Source: SCPS
Disadvantage misinformed: dummy = 1 if respondent says that dis-
advntage from being in the group is that he/she is misinformed.
Distance farm mkt: distance of village from closest farm market.
Source: HRDS
Distance livestock mkt: distance of village from closest livestock mar-
jet . Source: HRDS
Education: highest grade attained by respondent. Source: SCPS
Gen. Entr. (2): Generalized Entropy inequality measure, parame-
ter=2, computed from Indiv assets. Source: SCPS
Gini: Gini coe¢cient, computed from Indiv assets. Source: SCPS
Good or excellent functioning: dummy = 1 if respondent says that
group has good or excellent functioning. Source: SCPS
Groups frequently interact: dummy = 1 if respondent says that
groups interact frequently. Source: SCPS
Heterog activity: probability that two randomly drawn individuals
from the same village have di¤erent economic activities. Source: HRDS
Heterog education: standard deviation of the highest grade in school
obtained by household heads interviewed in the village. Source: HRDS
HH size: number of household members. Source: SCPS
33The su¢cient condition is that, when evaluated at h¤
1, @e y(h1+1)=2=@h1 <
@y(h1+1)=2=@h1: In fact when e y(h1+1)=2 <y (h1+1)=2 this guarantees that the right hand
side of (A.6) is less than 1, while the left hand side is greater than one by construction.
Notice, though, that even if @e y(h1+1)=2=@h1 >@ y (h1+1)=2=@h1; condition (A.6) may still
be satis…ed.
41Indiv assets: index of individual assets computed by summing scores
of each item owned, according to the following values: van or truck, car,
motorcycle, bicycle, sewing machine = 16, radio = 8, table = 6, bed, clock
or watch = 4, chair = 3, lamp = 2. If the asset was not working, these
weights were approximately halved. Source: SCPS
Leaders di¤erent living: dummy = 1 if respondent says that leaders
of group earn a living in a di¤erent way from the rest of members. Source:
SCPS
ln(Pop) in village: logarithm of village population. Source: HRDS
Members same living: dummy= 1 if respondent says that members of
group earn a living in the same way. Source: SCPS
Members all poor: dummy= 1 if respondent says that members of
group are all poor. Source: SCPS
Members mixed income group: dummy= 1 if respondent says that
members of group are from mixed income group. Source: SCPS
Members same clan: dummy= 1 if respondent says that members of
group are from same clan or tribe. Source: SCPS
Membership increased (4yrs): dummy= 1 if respondent says that
membership has increased in past 4 years. Source: SCPS
Rainfall crit. month avg: average precipitation (in mm.) in the critical
months of the growing season in 1987. The geographic area of reference is
the cluster (identi…ed by latitude and longitude), with a precision of minute
by minute. Sources: HRDS documentation; Tanzania Gazzetteer; Gommes
and Houssiau (1984); data collected at Harvard Institute for International
Development.
Rainfall crit. month std. dev: standard deviation of Rainfall in
critical month (see above).
Regions: dummies for the following six areas: coast, arid, quasi-arid,
plateaux, south west plains, northern highlands. Source: SCPS
Resid in village ¸ 10 yrs: dummy= 1 if respondent has been living in
same village for at least 10 years. Source: SCPS
Sex(F): dummy= 1 if respondent is female. Source: SCPS
StdDevLogs: standard deviation of ln(Indiv assets). Source: SCPS
Temperature avg: average temperature (in C degrees) in 1987. The
geographic area of reference is the cluster (identi…ed by latitude and longi-
tude), with a precision of minute by minute. Sources: HRDS documentation;
Tanzania Gazzetteer; data collected at Harvard Institute for International
Development.
42Temperature std. dev: standard deviation of Temperature (see above).
Tourism: dummy = 1 if village is in a touristic area. Sources: HRDS
documentation; Tanzania Gazzetteer.
Tribal fragmentation: probability that two randomly drawn individu-
als from the same village belong to di¤erent tribes. Source: HRDS
Very encouraged to participate: dummy= 1 if respondent feels very




Assets above avg 0 39.59
Atkinson .42 .16
Avg assets in village 36.54 19.12
Decision by vote .70 .46
Disadvantage-misinformed .11 .31
Distance farm mkt 1.16 1.96
Distance livestock mkt 4.73 5.53
Education 4.51 3.87
Gen Entr (2) .36 .47
Gini .36 .11
Good or excellent functioning .66 .47
Groups frequently interact .72 .45
Heterog activity 1.94 1.64
Heterog education 3.62 .98
HH size 6.31 3.31
Leaders di¤erent living .33 .47
ln(Pop) in village 12.49 .35
Members same living .18 .38
Members all poor .07 .25
Members mixed income group .92 .26
Members same clan .04 .20
Membership increased (4yrs) .56 .50
Rainfall crit. month avg 141.8 61.8






South West Plain .20 .40
Northern Highlands .09 .28
R e s i di nv i l l a g e¸ 10 yrs .86 .35
Sex(F) .12 .33
StdDevLogs .78 .22
Temperature avg 26.52 1.82
Temperature std dev 3.39 1.27
Tourism .06 .25
Tribal fragmentation .33 .25
Very encouraged to participate .66 .47
44Table 1: Membership
Mean
Member of any group .72
Member of political group .12
Member of church group .15
Member of mosque/muslim group .06
Member of burial society .12
Member of women’s group .05
Member of farmers’ group .05
Member of cattle rearing group .01
Member of coop .02
Member of Rosca .01
Source: author’s calculations on the SCPS.
45Table 2: Group characteristics
Panel A: Organizational rules
How become member?
Born Required Fee Voluntary
Religious .36 .04 .07 .55
Political .02 .13 .35 .51
Economic .02 .16 .19 .63
Supported by agency? (Yes = 39%)
Government NGO Foreign Church
Religious .03 .39 .07 .41
Political .53 .40 .01 .02
Economic .13 .54 .03 .07
Penalty if not pay fee?
Expelled Pay late Nothing
Religious .10 .11 .79
Political .38 .29 .32
Economic .39 .16 .45
Panel B: Members’ heterogeneity
Ethnicity
Same clan or tribe Di¤. tribes Anyone
Religious .01 .30 .69
Political .01 .24 .75
Economic .07 .23 .70
Make a living in the same way?
All same Most same Mixed Leaders di¤er
Religious .05 .12 .83 .34
Political .05 .08 .87 .32
Economic .07 .14 .78 .34
Income diversity
All rich or Little income Very mixed
all poor diversity income group
Religious .01 .23 .76
Political .01 .15 .84
Economic .01 .29 .71
Source: author’s calculations on the SCPS.
46Table 3: Basic regressions (marginal Probit coe¢cients)
(Dependent variable =1 if member of a group)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Age -.0004 -.0001 -.0004 -.0003
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Sex (F) .067 .089¤ .070 .097¤
(.047) (.045) (.050) (.045)
Education .014¤¤ .014¤¤ .008 .011¤
(.006) (.006) (.006) (.006)
HH size .01 .009 .004 .006
(.006) (.006) (.007) (.006)
Resid. in village¸10 yrs .046 .034 .040 .05
(.061) (.057) (.053) (.059)
Avg assets in village .003¤¤ .005¤¤ .003¤¤ .005¤¤
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
ln(Pop) in village -.031 -.09¤ -.073 -.09¤
(.05) (.052) (.052) (.055)
Heterog education .003 .004 .008
(.020) (.023) (.022)
Heterog activity .044 .017 .046
(.102) (.108) (.106)
Tribal fragmentation -.112 -.121 -.114
(.084) (.091) (.085)






1st assets quartile -.090¤
(.050)
4th assets quartile .053
(.049)
REGIONS Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. obs. 624 624 581 581
Pseudo Rsq .06 .07 .07 .07
Observed P .73 .73 .73 .73
Predicted P .75 .75 .75 .75
Notes:
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the village level.
47Table 4: instrumenting Gini
Dependent variable = 1 if member
Linear Prob Std error 2SLS Std error
Gini -.450¤¤ (.169) -.696¤ (.401)
INDIV & VILLAGE CONTROLS(a) Yes Yes
REGIONS Yes Yes
No. obs. 573 573
Rs q . . 0 7 . 0 7
1st stage: Dependent variable = Gini
Rainfall crit. month avg. -.0001 (.0001)
Rainfall crit. month std.dev. .009 (.006)
Temperature avg. -.014¤¤ (.004)
Temperature std. dev. -.0005 (.004)
Distance livestock mkt .003¤¤ (.001)
Distance farm mkt -.009¤¤ (.002)
Tourism .229¤¤ (.036)







¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the village level.
(a) Individual & village controls: all those listed in Table 3, column 1.
48Table 5: Inequality and relative wealth




Assets above avg. .004¤ .001 .01¤¤
(.002) (.002) (.004)
Gini -.488¤¤ -.290 -.908¤¤
(.219) (.289) (.331)
Assets above avg * Gini -.006¤ -.001 -.016¤¤
(.003) (.005) (.007)
INDIV & VILLAGE
CONTROLS(a) Yes Yes Yes
REGIONS Yes Yes Yes
No. obs. 581 398 178
Pseudo Rsq .07 .07 .11
Observed P .73 .73 .74
Predicted P .75 .74 .77
Notes:
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the village level.
(a) Individual & village controls: all those listed in Table 3, column 1.
49Table 6: Access rules and skewedness of income distribution
Inequality measure used:
Gen.Entr.(2) Gini Atkinson(2) StdDevLogs
OA groups
Ineq. -.068 -.403¤ -.255¤ -.195¤¤
(.063) (.246) (.134) (.097)
[+1 std.dev.]. [-.03] [-.03] [-.04] [-.03]
No. obs. 581 581 581 581
R sq. .10 .10 .10 .10
RA groups
Ineq. .153¤¤ .547¤¤ .206 .145
(.052) (.256) (.137) (.099)
[+1 std.dev.] [.07] [.04] [.03] [.02]
No. obs. 581 581 581 581
R sq. .08 .08 .08 .08
Notes:
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for het-
eroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals at the village level.
All regressions include individual, village, and region controls as in column 2 of table 3.
50Table 7: Group characteristics, by type
Type of group:
Religious groups Political groups Burial societes Women’s groups Farmer’s groups Coops & ROS
Dependent variable:
GROUP COMPOSITION:
[1] Members same clan 0.054 -0.031¤ 0.282¤ 0.124 0.293¤¤ -0.002
(1.39) (-1.75) (1.86) (1.23) (2.50) (-0.44)
[2] Members same living 0.176 -0.323 0.415¤ 0.643¤ 0.544 0.284
(0.85) (-1.41) (1.89) (1.82) (1.21) (0.84)
[3] Leaders di¤erent living 0.069 -0.454¤ -0.249 0.417 0.159 0.327
(0.34) (-1.67) (-0.85) (0.79) (0.38) (0.56)
[4] Members mixed income group -0.305¤¤ -0.045 -0.469¤¤ -0.483¤ -0.315 -0.014¤¤
(-2.83) (-0.40) (-4.65) (-1.67) (-0.86) (-2.51)
[5] Members all poor 0.234¤¤ -0.071 0.469¤¤ 0.433 0.315 —
(2.39) (-0.57) (4.65) (1.55) (0.86) —
GROUP FUNCTIONING:
[6] Decision by vote -0.166 -0.823¤¤ -0.214 -0.059 -0.714¤ 0.119
(-0.65) (-2.72) (-1.17) (-0.12) (-1.70) (0.24)
[7] Very encouraged to partecipate -0.351 -0.642¤ 0.129 -0.349 0.011 -0.301
(-1.56) (-1.85) (0.78) (-1.05) (0.03) (-0.55)
[8] Good or excellent functioning -0.711¤¤ -0.788¤ -0.168 0.135 -0.373 -0.376
(-3.45) (-1.93) (-0.95) (0.29) (-0.69) (-0.57)
[9] Disadvantage: misinformed -0.122 0.162¤¤ —— — 0 . 1 7 1
(-0.65) (2.60) — — — (0.36)
[10] Disadvantage: econ management 0.122 0.071 0.315 1.37¤¤ —0 . 4 7 9
(0.47) (0.14) (1.66) (1.98) — (0.68)
[11] Membership increased (4yrs) -0.309 -0.715 -0.297 -0.819¤¤ -0.312 -0.997
(-1.08) (-1.55) (-0.83) (-1.97) (-0.73) (-1.48)
[12] Groups frequently interact -0.337 -0.465 0.435¤ -0.523¤ 0.139 -0.455
(-1.24) (-1.55) (1.93) (-1.80) (0.37) (-0.85)
Notes:
¤ denotes signi…cance at the 10 percent level, ¤¤ at the 5 percent level.
Marginal probit coe¢cients calculated at the means. Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustering of the residuals
at the village level.y(i)
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